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Is there one set of scientific ethics? 
 
 
There are problems and opportunities regarding the ethical responsibility of the scientific 
community. We find some of these problems (and equally so opportunities) in the attempts to 
describe what scientific ethics are and can be, in the pursuit of understanding the ethical demands 
and intentions claimed and framed by the scientific community, and in the stated solutions to the 
problems of ethical character within science, with science’s integration in the global world, and 
amongst the scientists themselves. These descriptions, understandings and solutions are often times 
formulated as normative ethics, in many cases as a codex, or codes of conduct, established by a 
single university or a community of researchers or universities. These ethical codes therefore signal 
a particular form of ethical awareness or ethical reflection, that draws its strength and validity from 
a, more or less directly, postulated vision for an ethically better science, an ethically better scientist 
and, ultimately, an ethically better world as such.  
 
In this presentation I will reflect on one such vision, the COMEST-report titled 
Teaching of Ethics, from UNESCO, and try to demonstrate its lacks and flaws, as well as its 
strengths and good intentions. The report, as well as my own interest with this presentation, focuses 
mainly on the issue of teaching ethics to scientist. An important part of defining University Ethics 
has to include, in my opinion, some vision for teaching ethics at universities. This can be in the 
format of courses of different degree and level, but more importantly it is about creating an 
awareness of the ethical responsibilities, possibilities and foundation for science and the scientific 
activity a university performs and upholds. Basically the teaching of ethics under the understanding 
of University Ethics is finding a form and a forum for awareness, reflection and discussion of the 
ethical issue. This is also the attempt of the COMEST report.           
COMEST stands for The World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge 
and Technology, and the report is, as priory mentioned, titled The Teaching of Ethics. It was 
submitted to UNESCO in August 2003, and was presented and discussed on a follow-up 
symposium titled “Teaching ethics to science and engineer students”, in Copenhagen in April 2005. 
COMEST is an international board of scientists, headed by the chairman Dagfinn Føllesdal, who is 
the C.I. Lewis professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. It is a part of UNESCO’s Division of 
Ethics of Science and Technology, which has four areas of interest. These are (1) Bioethics, (2) 
Scientific ethics, (3) Environmental ethics and (4) Technology ethics. The division has declared a 
three part action program. One wishes to set certain standards of ethics, build up a capacity for 
ethical action, debate and reflection, and to raise an increasing awareness for ethical issues and 
reflections, and their importance. One effect of this declaration is the support for the creation of 
Educational Ethics Programs. In order to do this the division wants to define a core curriculum, and 
establish evaluation and certification programs that can be used as tools of measurement for 
different educational ethics programs around the world. That is, one wishes to set the standards for 
an ideal study program in scientific ethics, which all other programs can use to model themselves 
after. This ideal program will be postulated though publications and so called UNESCO-chairs at 
universities around the world, and will be designed and supervised by an Advisory Expert 
Committee. COMEST is such a committee.  
Here we can see that COMEST is a part of a well founded, and classic, idea of 
(epistemological) power and (educational) control, that has both a specific structure and a specific 
strategy. The structure is organized according to a clear top-down model. Decisions are made at the 
top and carried out at the bottom. Therefore we find the experts (a small group of distinguished 
scholars and elite researchers) at the top, and the workers (the large body of “ordinary” scientists, 
professors, teachers, students etc.) at the bottom. The strategy is then, that through the means of 
evaluation and certification, the top level can control the movements and actions at the lower levels, 
as well as the general direction of the development within the field. This calls for a well defined and 
powerfully established core of “the true and the good”, that is an idea of Ethics, which can be 
upheld as, and implemented in the absolute standards of scientific ethics. This core is the experts’ 
domain, and one attempt at formulating such a core is the COMEST report. 
 The COMEST group builds it’s report on the three assumptions, or three basic ground 
pillars. The first pillar is the idea that “the society” is concerned about the ethics of science. This 
concern is echoed or displayed in many different ways, and COMEST lists seven of them. Tempo, 
the rapidity of change and development, is number one on their list. Science is changing both itself 
and the society of which it is a part, with an unbelievable speed. We see this, first and foremost 
within the field of technology, but also in e.g. social sciences and management theories. The 
extreme tempo in modern science has both a practical effect (in applied science) and an 
academic/theoretical effect (with in the scientific community). We see the practical side of this in 
the product developments as well as applications of models for learning, living, leading, etc.; and 
the enormous output of academic articles and books are a good indication on the 
academic/theoretical effect. The reaction to all this is on one hand, of course the question if we 
move to fast, i.e. are the new products safe, healthy and ultimately for any good?; and on the other, 
a anti-science attitude, can science really produce that much new knowledge or are scientists just 
repeating and quoting themselves, can such a mass industry of academia provide any answers worth 
anything, is science really the right way to go in creating the good life? 
 Second on the list are globalisation and the cross-culture perspective. Science is 
regarded as a modern western phenomenon. When scientific activity is being spread around the 
world, what happens to science, and what happens to the different societies and cultures to which it 
is introduced or forced upon? We see a lot of problems arising when the scientific culture “clash” 
with non-scientific cultures (i.e. societies that are not rooted in the modern western enlightenment). 
The effects of this can be traced in fields of industry, finance, medicine, but also in more “soft” 
areas like education, language, and of course politics. The ethical concern here is if science will 
exploit or disregard the original culture, and perhaps ultimately destroy it, and to what extent people 
and nature will come to harm in such processes. Another element of ethical concern is the role 
money and power (epistemological as well as political) plays in this scientific colonisation of the 
world. 
 The other five elements on the list are pretty much specialised effects or parts of the 
first two. They can be described as ethical concerns around the use and abuse of internet and media, 
a fear of the effects from the fact that traditional upholders of ethics seems to be weakened, the 
magnification of science’s and applied science’s ability to do good and bad, the environmental 
issue, and the development of gene (especially human gene) technology. These last elements sums 
up a general attitude of ethical concern towards science and scientific activity, which we can find in 
almost any newspaper, television debate / documentary, or in the local bar, and at many dinner 
tables.   
 The second pillar, that COMEST recognises, has to do with the scientist. One claims 
that today’s scientist risks loosing track of him self. By that they imagine that a person that chooses 
to become a scientist has no clear idea of what that means, i.e. there is no fixed image that can 
appear as a (role-) model for the young scientist. Scientists today, work in various fields and with 
various functions, with very different responsibilities, demands and conditions, and as a result of 
that scientists finds themselves trying to fit in all shapes and sizes, and therefor also bearing all 
forms of ethical principle, motivation and apathy. Today’s scientists are ensemble-line workers, 
TV-stars, consultants, businessmen and so on. A general ethical code of conduct represented 
through a general description of “The Scientist”, as e.g. Robert King Merton’s famous CODUS 
(which of course found most of it’s forms in the Cambridge scholars of the 1930’s), has lost it’s 
appeal, or at least lost it’s use. However, as one reads the COMEST report, one does get the feeling 
that, at least, COMEST would like to see the return of CODUS to centre stage.      
 Finally, the third pillar. It is a clear idea of what ethics is. COMEST defines ethics as 
the systematic investigation of questions of right and wrong, good and bad. This idea must also 
carry the belief that moral principals can be “rewritten” as ethical arguments, and as such be 
submitted to a critical (rational) reflection. The aim is to, trough reflection and argumentation, find 
the right ethical standard, the right set of moral principles. What defines right in this case, are what 
we have good reasons for accepting. The basic idea of ethic’s, therefore appears as a form of an 
ethical JTB. But, in some opinions, it can also be understood in a more utilitarian or pragmatic 
fashion, however, that is not the intention of COMEST.  
 To answer the call of the pillars, COMEST suggests a comprehensive, systematic and 
thorough establishment of the teaching of ethics to future scientists. The aim of this teaching should 
be, and here I quote the report, that “the students should be familiar with the structure of normative 
argumentation”, which means that the student should posses knowledge of ethical notions, ethical 
theories and ethical issues. In a somewhat less authoritarian and dogmatic tone COMEST describes 
the content and teleology of teaching ethics to students of science with he help of five postulations. 
These can be summarised as:   
1. Awareness of ethical issues 
2. Clarity in ethical questions 
3. Make alternatives and consequences explicit  
4. Develop the skill for ethical analysis and argumentation 
5. Find areas where practice or legislation is at odds with ethical standards 
In practice COMEST suggest that the actual teaching is carried out according to a very simple top-
down structure. Ethical experts / professors teach ethical PhD’s, at a ethical research level. The 
ethical PhD’s then teach none ethical PhD’s, at the level of advanced courses, and ordinary 
students, at the level of basic courses.  
Furthermore, COMEST recommend the establishing of an international board of 
experts (in ethics). The board then supposedly designs a programme “The Teaching of Ethics”, 
which describes and formulates ethical research and courses at all levels. After that, universities and 
other establishments for higher education, submit there individual ethical teaching programmes 
before the board, which on the basis of their own ideal programme, evaluates and certifies the 
individual programmes. Hereby creating an international system for recognition and standard in the 
teaching of ethics, that will, through it’s principle of awarding through a hierarchy of certification, 
inspire and reward (some may say control and restrict) the actual teachers and creators of different 
ethical teaching programmes at universities around the world. 
An argumentative and decisive report like the COMEST report, is naturally an easy 
target for criticism. Two apparent perspectives of the critic, centres around, on the one hand the 
understanding of ethics, and on the other the top-down structure. There are a number of possible 
flaws and problems concerning COMEST definition and understanding of ethics. First of all it’s 
dependence on language. What language? Are we talking about an actual spoken language (and 
then a culturally bound language that naturally favours some people as well as arguments over other 
people and arguments), or are we talking about a specific scientific or philosophical language 
(which then will favour a specific form of science or a specific form of philosophy), or as a third 
option, are the talking about a simple (digital and/or logical) language like Wittgensteins ideal in 
Tractatus. The point is that every argument is an argument within a language, and as such it will be 
dependent on the restrictions and possibilities that the particular language provides. A side effect 
and an obvious problem here is also how one make an argument formulated in one language, 
justifiably “talk to” an argument formulated in another language.    
An interesting aspect of the COMEST understanding of ethics as arguments, and by 
that language, is on what arena the arguments appear. COMEST is advocating for arguments as 
logical, objective and formal, i.e. arguments representing a clean, genuine and critical rationalism, 
and against arguments that are rhetorical, subjective and contextual, i.e. arguments representing a 
dirty, false and sensible rationalism. Such a harsh and absolute distinction between logic and 
rhetoric’s, has a tendency to cause more problems than it solves. If one is as dependent on 
arguments as COMEST is, a more synthesising position could be proven more effective. Here 
another problem appears. How should the arguments be judged and validated? What makes an 
argument the right argument? One could imagine a fixed set of true principles matching a fixed set 
of right arguments, or just one principle that somehow governs them all, or that it is the process, the 
rational method, when put to use, that in it self managed to distinguish the right from the wrong 
argument. The report gives us no answer.          
In the COMEST report ethics is generally understood as formal (analytical) 
epistemology. It is normative and to some extent deontological (there is some talk of virtue), but 
fundamentally it is the believable result of a true reflection over justified arguments. Classic 
rationalism exercised not (only) by a cogito, but by a group of distinguished scholars, so called 
experts in ethics. However one leaves wondering how this group reflection is designed? Is it, or can 
it be dialectic, even Socratic dialectic? My guess is no. 
This brings us to the next obvious critic, i.e. the critic of the top-down structure. If one 
decides to be mean, one could simply ask, how do you become an expert in ethics, or better said, 
how are you appointed expert in ethics? Let me give you three possible answers. (1) By creative 
thinking and telling the truth; (2) By doing what you are told, according to the method, to the 
establishment, to the tradition etc.; or (3) By having cocktails with the right people. The problems 
and flaws in establishing a board of experts are quite apparent.  
The structure also indicates the problem of perceptiveness hand in hand with 
dogmatism. It is far too easy to simply regard the report as an instrument for implementing western 
thought and the ideas of the enlightenment on the rest of the world. Now I don’t think that 
COMEST has such a vicious vision, but when they create their top-down structure they make it 
very hard for someone to think differently and to get trough with a theory or thought that is not in 
tune with those at the top. There are to effects of this, first of all how can the reflection upon ethical 
arguments by valid if not all arguments can be heard?, and secondly, since many of the ethical 
problems are created by a top-down structure, how can a similar structure solve them or even 
recognise them? This is at the heart of the COMEST reports problems. I.e., what is an ethical 
problem? 
In what way are the concerns described in the report ethical problems? And whose 
ethical problem are they? This lacks to be expressed and defined, and one is left thinking that the 
ethical problem is not of any real importance after all. As long as we have an ideal ethical standard, 
an ethical code of conduct, which is the rational judging of ethical arguments, all problems will and 
can be solved. But an ethical problem can not be simply reduced or translated to the existence or 
inventions of a set of (formally) contradictory (critically rational) arguments. Ethical problems are 
people’s problems. They are rooted in a particular existence, in a here and a now, as well as in a 
there and in a then. They are embedded in culture and tradition, and expressed in and trough 
situations and individuals. This makes them “dirty” and personal. To make them “clean” and 
formal, so that they can be argumentatively reflected upon is not as easily done as the COMEST 
report seems to think it is. However, even more difficult, is the trip back, i.e. how to make the 
“clean” and formal answers “dirty” and personal, so that way can be applied to the problems they 
are meant to solve. 
The problems concerning the role and understanding of the ethical problem is an 
indication of the negative effects of the reports distinctive understanding of ethics and scientific 
ethics. COMEST has chosen a perspective, a specific view and a clear idea, and therefor it is unable 
to address ethical issues that is not included or recognised within that perspective. Most obvious is 
here the existential and human aspect, which within the field of philosophical ethics e.g. could be 
represented by such different thinkers as Nietzsche and Buber. Again one must wonder why 
COMEST has chosen such a dogmatic attitude, instead of a more synthesising approach. To be fair, 
one could argue that COMEST actually does advocate for an open and qualified dialog as the best 
means of solving ethical problems and understanding scientific ethics (like Habermas), but then one 
has to ask why this is only possible at the top, amongst the experts, and how the results of such an 
open dialogue will ever be of any real value and have any real implications (e.g. within the field of 
teaching ethics)?, besides such a reading of the report is undoubtedly ignoring some of its content.        
In conclusion, the COMEST report is generally a good thing. It is a wonderful and 
welcomed step in the direction of creating a good, just and prospering global society that embraces 
its science, as well as the core of scientific activities and notions, i.e. the rationality of man. But the 
report also has its flaws and difficulties. And, in my opinion, however agreeable the aim and the 
focus of the report is, I do believe that we need to think and act somewhat differently.  
We need to make ethics rational and scientific ethics argumentative. That is the only 
way in which we can make reasonable sense and sensible use of it, but we need to be more aware of 
different forms of argument and rationality (this includes cultural differences). In doing that we 
need to address different forms of ethical thinking, and more importantly, we need to be 
philosophers, i.e. we need to ask ourselves what is ethics?, what is an ethical problem?, an ethical 
action?, an ethical principle?, and so on. COMEST believes that this can only qualified and 
creatively (i.e. in reality) be done at the top, amongst the experts, and than in order to spread the 
good results they introduces the top-down structure with it’s dogmatic epistemological power and 
educational control, which basically calls for a double competence (the scientist knows it’s specific 
scientific field as well as the field of ethics). But it is a false image of competence on the ethical 
part, since it merely calls for a mechanical performance. By that I mean, that one way of 
interpreting the COMEST is to read it as actually having one idea of ethics (the dialectic 
philosophical critical reflection on arguments) at the top and another idea (the mechanical applied 
method of structuring arguments according to a fixed model) at the bottom.  
Unlike COMEST I believe that a rational (in the philosophical sense) idea of ethics 
can be placed at all levels, simply by making it personal and problem-based, i.e. to make the 
researcher, teacher and student aware of the ethics within and around oneself, and when build 
arguments, reflection, consequences etc. from that. The top-down structure should in my opinion be 
turned around, and placed upside down or, better said, flatted out. A board of expert evaluation and 
certifying the rest, on the basis of some general and formal standard of excellence, will probably not 
be successful. Instead we need to focus more on the local situations and conditions, the real 
problems and the real people, and hereby allowing different approaches and practices to the 
teaching of ethics, so that ethics becomes a natural and relevant part of those involved in and with 
it.  
Therefor, all though I agree with all of the five points summarised on page 6, it is 
perhaps the first postulation, to create awareness of ethical issues, which should be the only point of 
reference. If a university, through research in and teaching of ethics, can create awareness, amongst 
itself (i.e. amongst its scholars and students) the rest will probably, hopefully follow. So how does 
one do it? Again, a pre-fix general formula is not the right way, instead one should put ones faith in 
that teachers and researchers in ethics has their own bags of tricks, and through that can learn from 
each other. Personally I will, despite the approval or disapproval from a board of experts, continue 
to have my students in scientific ethics read Camus’ short story “The renegade – or a confused 
mind”. It always wakes people up, and generates a discussion and a reflection.            
 
The COMEST report can be found on the internet site www.portal.unesco.org. Here you search 
under it’s full title: Teaching of Ethics – report of the COMEST working group on the Teaching of 
Ethics. 
 
Thank you for the attention!  
 
